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may be enough to invoke the minimal due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment before a student may be suspended from a
public school on charges of misconduct.
Having expanded the Roth rationale to its logical limits, the Supreme
Court in Goss lends further authority to the proposition that governmental
infringement of any property interest granted by state law which is not
de minimus may, in a proper case, come under the protection of the due
process clause.73 However, the primary impact of the Goss decision is that
the courts are now in agreement that education is a property interest
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
a person cannot be arbitrarily deprived of an education, wherever the
right to that education is secured by a state compulsory attendance statute.
The Supreme Court appears to have gone as far as it can without
overruling Rodriquez74 and declaring education to be a fundamental right
protected by the United States Constitution.
GLENN W. SODEN
WRONGFUL DEATH: FETAL RIGHTS-CAUSE
OF ACTION GRANTED FOR FETAL DEATHS
UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974)
A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION, Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,' was decided
as a result of an automobile accident that occurred on March 2,
1974, near the small Alabama town of Gulf Shores. Although the facts
of the incident were not fully recounted, it appears that the plaintiff, who
was eight and one-half months pregnant at the time,2 was struck by a
negligently operated city police car and severely injured. Although plaintiff
recovered from her injuries, the child did not and was stillborn. 3 Mrs. Eich
then sued, seeking damages for the death of the unborn child and basing
her action on an Alabama wrongful death statute, entitled "Suits for
injuries causing death of minor child."'4 That statute reads in relevant
73 E.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), at 164 (Powell, J., concurring), and
at 171 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
74411 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1973), and at 110-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974).
2 Id. at 355.
3 Id.
4 The defense of gove:mmental _mmunity had been waived. Id. at 355 n.1.
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part: "When the death of a minor child is caused by the wrongful act, or
omission, or negligence of any person... the mother... may sue .... 5
The trial court dismissed the case, and the appeals court affirmed,
holding that the term "minor child" cannot be construed to include
children yet unborn.6 The Alabama Supreme Court did not agree however,
and in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores held that a cause of action for
prenatal wrongful death does exist under the Alabama statute.7
In so holding, the Alabama Supreme Court joins a growing number of
courts that have broadened judicial construction of wrongful death statutes,
to allow the prosecution of wrongful death actions in cases involving fetal
deaths. 8 In this respect Eich is not unique. However, the rationale used to
support this decision is unique and appears highly unsatisfactory.
Perhaps the most widely recognized rule of statutory construction is
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed,
and wrongful death statutes are in derogation of the common law rule that
a cause of action in tort dies with the victim. 9 In examining the statute
relied upon in Eich'0 it would seem apparent that the result should turn
upon the meaning of the term "minor child." Should it be construed so as
to include a fetus? The defendant argued that selection of this term
indicated legislative intent to limit the cause of action granted to children
born alive, and pointed for support to the decisions of other courts
construing similar language, which have held that fetal deaths are not
encompassed by such language, and that only the legislature can properly
extend a wrongful death statute to include such a cause of action.'
The Eich court was unimpressed, however, stating that "it is often
necessary to breathe new life into existing laws less [sic] they become stale
and shelfworn," and asserting that it felt responsibility to "insure the
necessary growth of the law in this vital area."'3 Thus, having stated its
5 ALA. Co. tit. 7, § 119 (1960).
6 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1974).
7Id.
sSimmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Panagopoulos v.
Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901(Ky. 1955); Verkennes v. Cornica, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) (this was
the first case in which recovery was allowed for the death of a fetus under a wrongful
death statute); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 NW.2d 229 (1951). See
also Note, Prenatal Injuries and Wrongful Death, 18 VAN. L. REv. 847 (19659.
9 Henry v. Jones, 306 F. Supp. 726 (D. Mass. 1969); Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App.
361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972); Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d
178 (1954); Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
10 ALA. CoDE tit. 7, § 119 (1960).
3 Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1972); McKillip v. Zim-
merman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967).
See also Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d (1962) (dissenting opinion); Chris-
tofogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 II1. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d (1973) (dissenting opinion).
12300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974).
Is Id.
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objective the court proceeded to justify its granting a cause of action in this
case, without ever touching directly upon the central issue, i.e., the true
meaning of the term "minor child" in the context of the statute at hand.'
4
To justify this action the court pointed to the underlying purpose of
the statute which was perceived as being the preservation of human life
through the punishment of wrongdoers, rather than the awarding of
compensation to survivors.15 According to the court, damages recoverable
under the wrongful death statute "are entirely punitive and are based on
the culpability of the defendant and the enormity of the wrong, and are
imposed for the preservation of human life."'16
By emphasizing this retributive purpose the court was able to resolve
what it felt was an inconsistency under prior law whereby recovery was
allowed where injury occurring during pregnancy caused the death of a
child after a live birth, but was denied where the injury caused the
immediate death of the fetus.17 The court pointed out that to deny recovery
in Eich "would only serve the tortfeasor by rewarding him for his
severity in inflicting the injury."' 8 The prospect of punishing a tortfeasor
in a situation where the child was born alive, but subsequently died
because of the injury, and denying a cause of action where the wrongful
act prevented live birth so impressed the court that it considered itself
compelled by "logic, fairness and justness" to recognize a cause of action
for prenatal wrongful deaths. 19
Although recognizing such a cause of action may lead to a just result,
basing this result on a theory of retribution presents certain problems. One
such problem was raised in the dissenting opinion. The homicide statutes
of Alabama, which also have as their purpose the preservation of human
life, have been construed so as to prevent the conviction for murder or
manslaughter of a person who has killed a fetus that was stillborn. 20 The
rationale behind this interpretation of the homicide laws is the axiom that
one cannot kill someone who is already dead.2 ' This inconsistency between
interpretations of the wrongful death statute and the homicide statute'5 is
14 ALA. COD tit. 7, § 119 (1960).
15 The inapplicability of the concept of compensatory damages with respect to the
Alabama death statutes was determined in 1912 in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Bogue, 177 Ala. 349, 58 So. 392 (1912).
16300 So. 2d 354, 356 (Ala. 1974), citing, Magnusson v. Swan, 291 Ala. 151, 279 So.
2d 422 (1973).
17 300 So. 2d 354, 355 (1974).
lId.
19 id.
20 Singleton v. State, 33 Ala. App. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
21 Id. at 378.
2 This inconsistency can also occur under Ohio law. The Ohio wrongful death statute,
OHIo REv. Con ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1968), allows recovery for a stillborn child as
shown by Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959). However,
under the Ohio vehicular homicide statute, Owio REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (Page
[Vol. 8:3
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particularly troublesome because, logically, the punitive purpose behind a
homicide statute should a fortiori be stronger than for a wrongful death
statute, especially with respect to homicides that involve a willful or
malicious destruction of life.
Another problem left open by the Eich court's reliance upon a theory
of retribution is precisely when the state's interest in the life of a fetus
begins for purposes of applying the wrongful death statute. If the Eich
court had squarely faced the problem of defining a "minor child" under
the statute, the problem of determining when the state's interest begins
would have been resolved. However, since according to the Alabama
Supreme Court wrongful death damages are to be determined solely "by
reference to the quality of the tortious act," 2 the implication is strong
that the life rights of a fetus, for purposes of applying the statute, emerge
at the moment of conception. If the emphasis is truly to be placed on the
punishment of those who interfere with potential human life, then it can
be argued that the same standard for recovery employed in an action
involving an eight and one-half-month-old fetus should be used in an
action involving a recently fertilized egg. But, if this be the case, how
would the court handle the complicated problems of proving causation
that would surely ensue? 24
Apparently, the Alabama Supreme Court would recognize a wrongful
death action in the case of a fetus that is considerably younger than eight
and one-half months, since the Eich opinion contains references to a state
interest in fetal deaths at earlier stages of pregnancy. In particular, the
court pointed out a provision of Alabama law requiring that a "death
certificate must be registered for all fetal deaths where the fetus was
advanced to or beyond the twentieth week of uterogestation," 25 as
expressive of a public interest in fetal deaths. In addition, the Eich court
cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade2"
for the proposition that "a potential future human life is present from
the moment of conception and the state's interest and general obligation
to protect life thus extends to prenatal life."'27
It would appear from a close reading of Roe v. Wade that the Eich
court's reliance on this case for direct support is somewhat shaded for the
1973 Special Supplement), there was no conviction for killing an unborn fetus, since
the unborn fetus was held not a "person" in State v. Dickinson, 23 Ohio App. 2d
259, 263 N.E.2d 253 (1970).
23300 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1974).
24 The practical problems of proving causation increase dramatically with less devel-
oped fetuses. However, as the Etch court points out, modem technology has made it
easier to prove the cause of death through the testimony of expert witnesses. 300 So.
2d at 358.
2 5 ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 24 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974).
Spring, 1975]
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/8
AKON LAw REviEw
Supreme Court, when referring to the legitimacy of recoveries in wrongful
death actions for fetal deaths, spoke in terms of actions to "vindicate the
parents' interest" in the loss of the potential child.E The court in Eich, on
the other hand, was not necessarily concerned with the personal loss to the
parents, but rather was concerned with the culpability of the tortfeasor and
the use of punishment as a means to promote the preservation of human life.
Nevertheless, there appears to be no direct conflict between the result
in Eich, and the Roe holding that a state may not outlaw abortion during
the first trimester of pregnancy. In Roe v. Wade states were restrained
from regulating abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy because the
mother's right to privacy was considered to outweigh the state's interest in
preserving fetal life.2 While the state must subordinate its interest in the
preservation of human life in the first trimester of pregnancy when
confronted with the mother's right to privacy, the state would not appear
to be precluded from asserting this interest as against a third party
tortfeasor. Consequently, there would seem to be no reason why Eich and
Roe need interfere with one another, since in the case of the tortfeasor
there is no countervailing interest equal to a mother's right to privacy.
Although the retributive rationale of Eich need not conflict with
abortion decisions, the traditional civil law rule on punitive damages raises
one further problem. In Kelite Products v. Binzel,30 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in applying this rule, summarized
the Alabama cases on punitive damages and noted: "To subject a
wrongdoer to punitive damages, the jury must find that he acted with
actual malice.., or conscious disregard of consequences to others." 3' It
was thus recognized that something more than the mere commission
of a tort is necessary for an award of punitive damages.
Therefore, it seems strange that the concept of punitive damages
should be applied to an ordinary case of vehicular negligence simply
because an action is brought under a wrongful death statute on behalf of
a decedent. Nor does it seem proper to base such a result on the theory
that a reasonable man would be "doubly careful toward a woman who is
obviously pregnant." Certainly the potential tortfeasor in an accident
involving two or more vehicles is most often not in a position to discern
the maternal condition of potential victims. Thus, it would seem that no
matter how compelling the equities in favor of allowing a cause of action
for a fetal death under a wrongful death statute, the theory of retribution
set forth in Eich does not provide a proper basis for such a cause of action.
28 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
29Id. at 163.
3o224 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1955).
31 Id. at 143.32 Note, Torts-Right of Infant to Recover for Prenatal inures, 48 MICH. L. REv.
539, 540 (1950).
['Vol. 8:3
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As alluded to earlier, other courts faced with similar issues have
achieved like results without resorting to the Eich court's questionable and
confusing reliance on a punitive rationale. 33 The majority of such courts
have straightforwardly ruled that the language of the statute involved does
include a fetal death, basing that decision on the rationale that the statute
is compensatory in nature, and the survivor has as much right to
compensation for a life prevented, as for a life lost.3 4
Furthermore, these courts have presented identifiable guidelines for
recovery bearing upon the problem of proving causation, by ruling that
wrongful death actions should result in recovery only in cases where
prenatal death had been inflicted on a fetus that was viable (capable of
life outside the womb) at the time of the injury.3 5 The rationale is that the
probability of continued survival once this stage of development is reached
is great enough to outweigh lack of proximate cause arguments based
upon the probability of miscarriage or other natural causes of stillbirth.36
Basing recovery on viability of the fetus at the time of the injury has
been viewed as a convenient answer to the troublesome hypothetical first
mentioned in Stidam v. Ashmore,37 wherein an Ohio Court of Appeals
posed the situation of twins who are wrongfully injured during pregnancy
whereupon the one born alive and who subsequently dies is allowed
recovery, but the one stillborn is denied recovery. Presumably, if
viability was the only factor determining recovery, the death of both
twins would result in recovery.3
8
Indeed, the viability concept provides a rational demarcation point
for courts faced with the issue of when a fetus is to be recognized as a
person in any context. As a matter of law, a court can readily draw the
line between recovery and no recovery when it is determined that a
33 See cases cited note 8 supra.
34 See Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Stokes v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); McKillip v. Zimmerman.
191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Lecese v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1972);
c/. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949). See also cases cited
note 8 supra.
35 A fetus becomes "viable" when it can "potentially live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). Viability is usually
placed in the six to seven months of pregnancy range, although there are instances of
younger fetuses that have survived outside the womb. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955). For those courts allowing recovery based on viability, see Christofo-
georgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Orange v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1969); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518
P.2d 636 (Ore. 1974), rehearing denied, 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 1974); Baldwin v. Butcher,
184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971). For case law development prior to 1969 see Note,
Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus--A Current Analysis, 7 HousToN L. REv.
449, 452 n.1 (1970).
36 See cases cited notes 8 & 34 supra.
37109 Ohio App. 431, 434, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).
38 See cases cited note 35 supra.
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particular fetus was not viable at the time of injury.3 9 If the determination
of viability was not made at the trial level, a higher court may remand
a case for an examination of a fetus' ability to live independently of
its mother at the time of the injury.40
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic,4 the United States Supreme Court's abortion decision
in Roe v. Wade" contains important language bearing on the role of
the viability concept in determining the rights of a fetus:
... a fetus is not a "person" for the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States... after a fetus
has become "viable" a state may prohibit abortion altogether, except
those necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother and...
"State regulation protective of fetal life after viability.., has both
logical and biological justification."3
Perhaps the greatest difficulty stemming from the Eich decision is its
failure to explain why the viability concept, with its "logical and
biological justification," should have no bearing even as to a wrongful
death statute that is based solely on a punitive purpose.
Not only does recognition that the Alabama statute has "always been
held to be punitive only" 44 obscure application of the widely accepted
viability concept, but it runs contrary to the fundamental concept of
tort law that instead of directing punishment against a wrongdoer, it
is more important to provide "compensation to an innocent plaintiff
for the loss that he has suffered." 45
It would seem that the punitive nature of the Alabama statute is
purely a- product of judicial construction, since a simple reading of the
statute reveals that it is phrased in much the same language as is used in
the wrongful death statutes of states that adhere to the compensation
concept." In light of the principle that punitive damages should be
awarded only where there is actual malice or its equivalent, the concept
of punitive damages should logically apply only under a wrongful death
statute that provides for separate causes of action that distinguish between
purely negligent killings and wanton or intentional killings. Without such
39 Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (fetus was 4-4% months old at
time of injury).
40 Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
41518 P.2d 636 (Ore. 1974), rehearing denied, 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 1974).
42410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 3Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, 640 (Ore. 1974).
44300 So. 2d 354, 356 (Ala. 1974).
45 Gay v. Thompson, 146 S.E.2d 425, 430 (N.C. 1966), citing, D. Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 579, 595 (1965).
4Most wrongful death statutes, including that of Alabama, apply to killings caused
in any manner whatsoever. See OnIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1968) (deaths
caused by "wrongful acts, neglect, or default"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (1953)
(deaths "occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence").
[Vol. 8:3
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a distinction justification of an award based on compensatory damages
becomes logically compelling.
Even the court in Eich could not completely divorce itself from the
concept of compensatory damages, for in countering defendant's argument
that allowance of a wrongful death action in cases involving fetal deaths
would make for a double recovery, the Alabama court referred to the
existence of an injury to two different persons, but pointed out that
the plaintiff should be given relief for her physical and mental injuries,
and punitive relief "derived through her right to maintain the wrongful
death action for the loss of her minor child."' 47 (Emphasis added.)
Such language clearly indicates an intent to compensate the survivor;
and, for the reasons outlined above, it appears that a less confusing result
and more justifiable opinion would have resulted from a formal recognition
of the compensatory concept in Alabama wrongful death statutes.
It should be pointed out, however, that adoption of the compensatory
standard, in and of itself, does not solve the problem of the amount of
damages that should be awarded for fetal deaths in an action based upon
a wrongful death statute. This problem has so perplexed a few courts
that they have simply denied recovery on the ground that the wrongful
death damages are too speculative.48
Perhaps the most ingenious attempt to measure the monetary loss
occasioned by the death of a fetus is presented by the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gullborg v. Rizzo.4 There the court
adopted an elaborate formula by which monetary damages were arrived at
by subtracting the anticipated maintenance expenses of the child from the
present value of the child's prospective earnings for the balance of its
life expectancy after the age of 21.50 Pursuant to this formula the court
determined from actuarial tables that a female child would have 53 years
of earning capacity and that a jury award of $5,000 or even $10,000
for the loss of a fetus was not excessive. 51
Other less adventuresome courts might well conclude, as the Oregon
court in Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,52 that a recovery should not be
limited to the pecuniary value of the lost child's life, but rather should
simply reflect the "value of life lost."
47 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1974).
48 Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1966). See also Norman
v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (1954); Graf. v. Taggert, 43
NJ. 303, 204 A.2d 140, 145 (1964).
49331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964), interpreting Pennsylvania's Survival Acts, PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 20, §§ 320.601-.603 (1958), and wrongful death statutes, PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 12, §§ 1601, 1602 (1953).
50 331 F.2d at 560.
Sl Id. at 561.
52518 P.2d 636, 639 (Ore. 1974), rehearing denied, 520 P.2d 361 (Ore. 1974).
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Perhaps this disparity could be resolved by turning away from the
wrongful death statutes themselves as the vehicle through which such
awards are delivered. As long as courts are "breathing" into the law why
not cast the wind in another direction and recognize that the reason a
mother should be allowed a recovery beyond her immediate physical and
mental pain and suffering is because she has suffered a very special kind of
loss--one that goes beyond ordinary concepts of pain and suffering.
If one were actually to make a serious attempt to quantify such a loss
for the purpose of making a monetary award, the best place to start would
be considering that in spite of the many thousands of dollars that a child
costs its parents during its years of dependency, the value of the child to
its parents must be an amount even greater, for if this were not true,
parents given the choice would not elect to have children in the first place.
Exactly how much more children are worth than their "maintenance cost"
is anybody's guess. At any rate, it hardly seems likely that the answer to this
question is any more difficult than the determination of how much money
allows for an adequate punishment under a theory of wrongful death.
53
In any case the question will be further complicated by the possibility
that the fetus, had it been left unharmed, might not have been born alive
in any event. Naturally, the older the fetus is, the more likely it is to
survive. This factor is no doubt responsible for decisions that allow recov-
ery only if the fetus was viable when the injury occurred.5 However, the
difficulty with the viability theory is that undoubtedly a great number of
fetuses that are killed before they become viable could have reached a live
birth. Thus, a Georgia court of appeals, recognizing that the viability point
does not fully account for the potential for live birth inherent in most fetuses
at earlier stages of development, has allowed recovery for death caused at
any time after a fetus has become "quick" or capable of movement.55
It seems logical that if a court is willing to go this far, it could allow
recovery for any death from the moment of conception and permit the
technical difficulties of proof of causation to weed out claims for
the wrongful killing of fetuses only a few days or weeks old. Consequently,
if the age of the fetus is to have any bearing at all, it stands to reason that
it should simply be another factor to consider in assessing damages. All
other factors being equal, it seems logical that the younger fetus, being less
capable of surviving independently of its mother and thus being subject to
a greater risk of nonsurvival, should be the subject of a lesser award.
53 Consider what amount of money is proper to punish a motorist whose negligent
making of a left-hand turn causes the death of a fetus he did not know existed in the
womb of a woman riding in a car he did not see until after the accident occurred.
54 See cases cited note 35 supra.
55 The court in Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1955),
recognized that the question of whether a fetus was "quick" is one for a jury. In this
case a fetus was deemed "quick" after only 1 % months of pregnancy.
[Vol. 8:3
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Whatever the method used to calculate the monetary loss engendered
by the killing of a fetus, it is the loss itself, however elusive to define,
coupled with the fact that the tortfeasor has caused this loss, that should
serve as the basis for recovery. To the extent that the decision in Eich
allows recovery in a wrongful death action where a tortfeasor has caused
a mother to suffer this special kind of loss, the decision is just and
logical. But, it is hoped that other courts facing this issue will reach their
result in a more acceptable manner.
MARY ANN KOVACH
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